Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Riskat Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants October 2000 | Pressurized Water Reactor | Risk

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Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Risk at Decommissioning Nuclear Power Plants October 2000 Technical Contributors Group Leaders: Timothy E. Collins, DSSA George Hubbard, DSSA/SPLB Glenn Kelly, DSSA/SPSB Michael Cheok, DSSA/SPSB Gareth Parry, DSSA Mark Rubin, DSSA/SPSB Robert Palla, DSSA/SPSB Risk Assessment: Primary Technical Support: Seismic Criticality Thermal-hydraulics Goutam Bagchi, DE Robert Rothman, DE/EMEB Larry Kopp, DSSA/SRXB Anthony Ulses, DSSA/SRXB Joseph Staudenmeie
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  Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accident Riskat Decommissioning Nuclear Power PlantsOctober 2000  Technical ContributorsGroup Leaders:Timothy E. Collins, DSSAGeorge Hubbard, DSSA/SPLBRisk Assessment:Glenn Kelly, DSSA/SPSBMichael Cheok, DSSA/SPSBGareth Parry, DSSAMark Rubin, DSSA/SPSBRobert Palla, DSSA/SPSBPrimary Technical Support:SeismicGoutam Bagchi, DERobert Rothman, DE/EMEBCriticalityLarry Kopp, DSSA/SRXBAnthony Ulses, DSSA/SRXBThermal-hydraulicsJoseph Staudenmeier, DSSA/SRXBWalt Jenson, DSSA/SRXBChristopher Boyd, RES/DSARE/SMSABConsequencesJason Schaperow, RES/DSARE/SMSABCharles Tinkler, RES/DSAREHeavy LoadsEdward Throm, DSSA/SPSBSecondary Technical Support:Additional Support:Tanya Eaton, DSSA/SPLBDavid Diec, DSSA/SPLBDiane Jackson, DSSA/SPLBJohn Lehning, DSSA/SPLBStudy Preparation:Paula Magnanelli, DSSA  v October 2000 Technical Study of Spent Fuel Pool Accidentsat Decommissioning Plants Table of ContentsEXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................viii1.0INTRODUCTION........................................................1-12.0THERMAL-HYDRAULIC ANALYSES........................................2-13.0RISK ASSESSMENT OF SPENT FUEL POOLS AT DECOMMISSIONING PLANTS...3-13.1Basis and Findings of SFP Risk Assessment.............................3-23.2Characteristics of SFP Design and Operations for a Decommissioning Plant...3-33.3Estimated Frequencies of Spent Fuel Uncovery and Assumptions That Influencethe Results........................................................3-63.3.1Internal and External Initiator Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Uncovery....3-73.3.2Important Assumptions.......................................3-113.4Internal Event Scenarios Leading to Fuel Uncovery.......................3-123.4.1Loss of Cooling.............................................3-123.4.2Loss of Coolant Inventory......................................3-143.4.3Loss of Offsite Power from Plant-Centered and Grid Related Events...3-153.4.4Loss of Offsite Power from Severe Weather Events................3-153.4.5Internal Fire.................................................3-163.4.6Heavy Load Drops...........................................3-163.4.7Spent Fuel Pool Uncovery Frequency at Times Other Than 1 year AfterShutdown..................................................3-183.5Beyond Design Basis Spent Fuel Pool Accident Scenarios (External Events)..3-183.5.1Seismic Events.............................................3-183.5.2Aircraft Crashes.............................................3-233.5.3Tornadoes.................................................3-243.6Criticality in Spent Fuel Pool.........................................3-253.7Consequences and Risks of SFP Accidents............................3-273.7.1Consequences of SFP Accidents...............................3-283.7.2Risk Modeling for SFP Accidents................................3-343.7.3Risk Results................................................3-394.0IMPLICATIONS OF SPENT FUEL POOL (SFP) RISK FOR REGULATORYREQUIREMENTS.......................................................4-14.1Risk-Informed Decision Making........................................4-14.1.1Increases in Risk.............................................4-24.1.2Defense-in-Depth.............................................4-64.1.3Safety Margins...............................................4-84.1.4Implementation and Monitoring Program..........................4-104.2Implications for Regulatory Requirements for Emergency Preparedness, Security,  vi October 2000and Insurance.....................................................4-134.2.1Emergency Preparedness.....................................4-134.2.2Security...................................................4-144.2.3Insurance..................................................4-155.0SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS...........................................5-16.0REFERENCES.........................................................6-17.0ACRONYMS...........................................................7-1List of FiguresES-1 Individual Early Fatality Risk Within 1 Mile.....................................xiES-2 Individual Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles...........................xiiFigure 2.1Heatup Time From 30 °C to 900 °C....................................2-3Figure 2.2PWR Heatup Times for Air Cooling and Adiabatic Heatup..................2-3Figure 3.1Assumed Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System..............................3-3Figure 3.2Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Seismically Induced Failure Based on LLNLEstimates and an HCLPF of 1.2 g Peak Spectral Acceleration.............3-21Figure 3.3 Frequency of Spent Fuel Pool Seismically Induced Failure Based on EPRIEstimates and an HCLPF of 1.2 g Peak Spectral Acceleration..............3-22Figure 3.7-1Early Fatality Consequences for Spent Fuel Pool Source Terms ........3-32Figure 3.7-2Societal Dose Consequences for Spent Fuel Pool Source Terms .......3-33Figure 3.7-3Spent Fuel Pool Early Fatality Risk ................................3-41Figure 3.7-4Spent Fuel Pool Societal Risk ....................................3-42Figure 3.7-5Sensitivity of Early Fatality Risk to Emergency Planning — Cask DropEvent .......................................................3-43Figure 3.7-6Sensitivity of Societal Risk to Emergency Planning — Cask Drop Event...3-44Figure 3.7-7Individual Early Fatality Risk Within 1 Mile ..........................3-47Figure 3.7-8Individual Latent Cancer Fatality Risk Within 10 Miles .................3-48List of TablesTable 2.1Time to Heatup and Boiloff SFP Inventory Down to 3 Feet Above Top of Fuel(60 GWD/MTU)..................................................2-1Table 3.1 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Risk Analysis — Frequency of Fuel Uncovery .....3-9Table 3.2Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Risk Analysis — Frequency Partition for Air Flow...3-10Table 3.7-1Consequences of an SFP Accident With a High Ruthenium Source Term ..3-29Table 3.7-2Consequences of an SFP Accident With a Low Ruthenium Source Term ..3-30Table 3.7-3Frequency of Boil Down Events Leading to Spent Fuel Uncovery ..........3-35Table 3.7-4Mean Frequency of Rapid Draindown Due to Seismic Events.............3-37Table 3.7-5Frequency of Rapid Draindown Spent Fuel Uncovery Due to NonseismicEvents .......................................................3-38Table 4.1-1Industry Decommissioning Commitments ............................4-11Table 4.1-2Staff Decommissioning Assumptions ...............................4-12
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